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3Abstract: The ill-fated Dieppe Raid was 
a bitter and costly defeat for Canadian 
and Allied forces. Seventy years 
on the raid continues to command 
both academic and popular interest. 
Contemporary commentators and 
some historians have argued that the 
raid provided many useful lessons for 
the successful Normandy landings 
in June 1944. Very little, however, 
has been written about the German 
view of the raid. What did Hitler, the 
Wehrmacht, and the German people 
think of the raid and its outcome? 
How was it portrayed in the Nazi 
controlled media, and what impact 
did it have on German strategic 
thinking in the summer and autumn 
of 1942? Drawing extensively on 
contemporary German sources, this 
article demonstrates that the German 
view of the Dieppe raid differed 
greatly from the more familiar Anglo-
Canadian narrative.
Just before dawn on the morning of 19 August 1942, a force of some 
6,000 soldiers and marines – mainly 
Canadians but also slightly more than 
a 1,000 British Commandos, 50 US 
Rangers, and some Fighting French 
troops – supported by 250 small 
naval craft and over 65 squadrons 
of RAF fighters and light bombers 
attacked the French fishing port 
and casino town of Dieppe on the 
Normandy coast. Their aim was to 
take and hold the German occupied 
port for a day and then conduct an 
orderly withdrawal. The amphibious 
assault was planned and conducted 
by Admiral Lord Mountbatten’s 
Combined Operations Headquarters, 
and it was described as the largest 
raid ever attempted in history. It 
was also the most costly in losses 
suffered. The Canadians lost 68 
percent of their assault forces and 
the British Commandos suffered 257 
casualties whilst the RAF lost 106 
aircraft (the most lost in action on a 
single day during the war) and the 
Royal Navy lost one destroyer and 
33 landing craft of various types. 
The overall casualty rate exceeded 
40 per cent, the highest in the war 
for any major offensive involving the 
three services.1 The appalling nature 
of the debacle led immediately to 
searching questions and high level 
investigations in London and Ottawa 
to determine what went wrong, why 
the raid was such a costly failure, 
and who was responsible. Relations 
between Britain and her allies, most 
notably Canada but also the United 
States and the Soviet Union, were 
severely strained, and a historical 
controversy began which to this day 
continues to generate academic and 
public interest.
In an attempt to mitigate the 
immediate bitterness and humiliation 
of the disastrous undertaking, 
contemporary newspaper and radio 
commentators as well as military 
analysts, and subsequently historians, 
tried to see some good emerging 
from the raid. Captain Charles Perry 
Stacey, an historian in uniform on 
the headquarters staff of Lieutenant-
General Andrew McNaughton, the 
commander of First Canadian Army 
and the senior Canadian officer 
in the United Kingdom, drafted 
explanations of the Dieppe raid for 
the Canadian press. Within a fortnight 
of the raid Stacey also completed 
a lengthy official Canadian Army 
report justifying Dieppe as a vital 
learning experience.2 Later, in July 
1944, not long after the Normandy 
landings,  General Eisenhower 
wrote to Mountbatten and in his 
letter credited Dieppe with having 
provided many useful lessons.3 
The much lighter than expected 
Allied casualties on D-Day appear to 
validate Eisenhower’s analysis. This 
theme was expanded on in detail 
by Captain Stephen W. Roskill, the 
author of the multi-volume official 
British history, The War at Sea, 1939-
1945. Roskill states that the Germans 
drew all the wrong lessons from 
Dieppe. By concentrating their anti-
invasion defences on the main ports 
along the Channel Coast, Roskill 
inferred, the Germans contributed 
greatly to the Allies’ successful 
landings on the Normandy beaches.4
There is little if any evidence 
to support Roskill’s hypothesis, 
particularly, in the German documents 
and records of the Second World War. 
In fact, very little has been written on 
the German view of the Dieppe raid. 
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4What did Hitler, the German General 
Staff, and the German people think 
of the raid and its outcome? How 
was Dieppe portrayed in the Nazi 
controlled media, and what were the 
consequences of the raid on German 
strategy in the summer of 1942? 
These questions are the subject of 
this article.
Historiography and 
German sources
Brian Loring Villa, the author of Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten 
and the Dieppe Raid ,  lamented 
that “the literature on Dieppe is 
nearly as extensive as that on the 
Normandy invasion—completely out 
of proportion to Dieppe’s military 
importance.”5 He is certain that 
had Dieppe been a success then it 
would not have attracted the intense 
and enduring attention it has from 
generations of British and Canadian 
historians. The first book on Dieppe 
appeared less than five months after 
the raid and two more followed in 
quick succession in 1943. The three 
books were written by newspaper 
journalists from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.6 
They were also privileged guests on 
the command ship during the raid, 
personally chosen by Mountbatten 
because they were “journalists who 
were likely to turn out instant books.”7 
Perhaps, then, because Dieppe was a 
minor success for the Wehrmacht, 
and because Germany also lost 
the war, the raid has not featured 
prominently in the German historical 
narrative. Less understandable 
is  why the  Engl ish  language 
historiography has neglected the 
German side of the story despite 
some 70 years of detailed historical 
examination. Until now the only 
publication in English that examined 
the German perspective was Hans J. 
Peterson’s article “The Dieppe Raid 
in Contemporary German View,” 
which appeared in the American 
Review of Canadian Studies in 1983. 
Peterson is German, and he was a 
young boy living in Berlin when the 
Dieppe raid took place in August 
1942. His article focuses on three 
days of intense coverage of the raid 
in the Völkischer Beobachter, the official 
national newspaper of the Nazi Party. 
It is particularly revealing on the 
importance the Nazi media attached 
to the personality of “the leader” in 
conducting the war, hence the paper’s 
biting criticisms of Churchill over the 
strategic purpose and tactical failure 
of the raid.8 This, however, is only a 
small part of the story, and it does 
not deal with the larger tensions 
that existed in Germany during the 
summer of 1942. Difficult decisions 
over the allotment of increasingly 
scarce resources, the perplexing 
military complications thrown up 
by multiple and simultaneously 
active theatres of operations, fears 
over wavering morale on the home 
front, and an increasingly fractious 
relationship between Hitler and 
his army generals (particularly 
his Eastern Front generals) were 
all affected by the sudden and 
unexpected events of the Dieppe raid 
on 19 August 1942. Readily accessable 
German primary sources, including 
the Völkischer Beobachter  (VB)9 
and other contemporary German 
newspapers, the Kriegstagebuch 
des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 
(War Diary of the High Command 
of the Armed Forces OKW), Die 
Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels (Joseph 
Goebbels Diaries), Die Deutsche 
Wochenschau (The German Weekly 
News – newsreels played in German 
cinemas), and Hitler’s speeches, 
directives, proclamations, and 
table talk, offer a rich history of the 
interplay of these tensions and the 
impact of the Dieppe raid on their 
resolution by the autumn of 1942. 
These sources also reveal that the 
German reaction to and analysis of 
the Dieppe raid is very different from 
the more familiar Anglo-Canadian 
narrative.
The threat of invasion 
and the Atlantic Wall, 
June 1941 – August 1942
Beginning in June 1941, with the invasion of  the Soviet 
Union, Field Marshal Gerd von 
Rundstedt, commander-in-chief 
Army Group South and from March 
1942 commander-in-chief in the 
West, regularly voiced his concerns 
to Hitler over an Allied invasion in 
the West.10 His warnings took on 
added importance with the failure of 
Operation Barbarossa in December 
and led Hitler to order on 14 December 
the building of a new West Wall 
to defend the whole Atlantic coast. 
These orders were followed in March 
1942 with Führer Directive No.40, 
which outlined the potential threat 
of an invasion and the benefits to be 
had from building strong defences 
to deter any “bold adventures.” 
Hitler did not fear any serious risk 
of losing Western Europe in 1942 but 
he was concerned about Churchill’s 
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difficulty of dislodging an 
invasion force if it managed 
to secure a foothold. More 
than 75 percent of Germany’s 
military power was committed 
to the war against the Soviet 
Union and Hitler wanted 
to minimise any serious 
diversions in the West that 
had the potential to delay 
victory in the East. Hitler’s 
concerns seemed justified in 
early July 1942 when German 
intelligence warned that an 
Anglo-American decision on 
where and when the “Second 
Front” would be launched was 
imminent. This information 
reinforced Hitler’s resolve 
to build an impregnable 
fortress line along the entire 
Atlantic coastline facing 
Britain. On 2 and 13 August, 
Hitler chaired two conferences on 
the Atlantic Wall at his advanced 
military headquarters, code named 
Wehrwolf, at Vinnitsa, in the Ukraine. 
Reich Minister Albert Speer, General 
Hermann Reinecke, and a number 
of other fortification and military 
experts were in attendance.11
Immediate German reaction 
to the Dieppe Raid, 
19 August 1942
Hitler and his staff were busy grappling with the day to day 
events of the Caucasus campaign 
when news of the Dieppe Raid 
reached Führerhauptquartier (FHQ) 
Wehrwolf. Vice-Admiral Theodore 
Krancke, who was at the FHQ, noted 
that the mood was calm and relaxed, 
and that the predominant attitude 
was one of confident satisfaction 
rather than jubilation. Hitler was 
visibly pleased with the response 
of the German garrison in Dieppe 
but also with the fact that the raid 
appeared to confirm his strategic 
view of the war in 1942. Churchill 
had tried an audacious attack and it 
had been thwarted with speed and 
conviction.12
The German people first learnt 
about the raid through the Norwegian 
German Radio Service on 19 August 
at 1200 hours central European time 
(CET). A short message stated that:
the British in the early hours of this 
morning made a landing on the 
French channel coast supported by 
considerable numbers of air and 
naval forces. The British who have 
landed infantry and tanks met hard 
and successful resistance of the 
German troops. Several British tanks 
were destroyed by German 
artillery fire which started 
immediately. German counter-
measures continue according 
to plan.13
Initial German 
news coverage
Not unti l  2030 hours on 19 August was the 
first official statement on the 
British cross-channel attack 
broadcast to the German 
p e o p l e .  T h e  n e w s  w a s 
reported in a Sondermeldung 
(special bulletin) issued by the 
High Command of the Armed 
Forces (OKW). The OKW 
bulletin outlined the enemy 
forces that took part, their main 
objective to form a bridgehead 
around Dieppe, and the heavy 
casualties they suffered in 
their failed invasion attempt. 
The report was factual and 
reasonably accurate, and the 
casualty numbers reported 
were actually lower than 
those confirmed later. But 
because it was a special report it 
differed slightly from the usual 
regular daily situation reports issued 
by OKW and included an assessment 
of the attack along with speculation 
on Churchill’s motivation to mount 
it at the behest of a desperate Josef 
Stalin. The bulletin concluded with 
a comforting summary of the day’s 
events for the German people: “The 
enemy has suffered a decisive defeat. 
His attempt at invasion served only 
political purposes and was contrary 
to all military common sense.”14
The editorial comment offered 
by OKW was deliberate for two 
reasons: it was intended to heap more 
pressure on Churchill and the British 
with their allies, and it was good for 
public morale in Germany. Hitler and 
most of the generals viewed Dieppe 
as a hastily concocted raid to fulfil a 
promise to Stalin to open a second 
F i e l d  M a r s h a l  G e r d  v o n 
Rundstedt, commander-in-chief 
in the West, regularly voiced his 
concerns to Hitler over an Allied 
invasion in the West.
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6front. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, 
head of OKW, and General Kurt 
Zeitzler, chief of staff to Field Marshal 
Rundstedt, however, took a more 
serious view, that it was an invasion 
that had failed. Was it an invasion or 
a raid? Was it an invasion that took 
Combined Operations HQ nine or 
ten months to prepare (as reported 
in the British papers) and ended nine 
hours later with the enemy assault 
forces thrown back into the sea, or 
was it a raid hastily concocted four 
or five days after Churchill had 
visited Stalin in Moscow? Both lines 
were developed in the following 
days with each reinforcing the 
other as confirmation of Churchill’s 
desperation and stupidity.15
Early in the morning on 20 
August, Joseph Goebbels flew from 
Berlin to FHQ Wehrwolf to confer with 
Hitler on the media line to be taken 
in response to Dieppe. Goebbels 
recorded the day’s events in his diary, 
noting first the excellent mood in the 
Führerhauptquartier. He shared the 
Führer’s general assessment of the 
raid, that it was a rash action by the 
British in response to severe pressure 
from Stalin to open a Second Front. 
Goebbels spent much of the afternoon 
with Hitler finalising the main themes 
for the press releases in the next 
day’s papers, discussing a recent 
opera performance of Turandot in 
Munich, and walking in the forest 
around the FHQ with Hitler and his 
Schäferhündin “Blondi.” His diary 
entry for the day numbered some 
30 pages or roughly 15,000 words, 
drifting between his delight at once 
again being in the Führer’s company 
and a scathing critique of Churchill’s 
military and political leadership. He 
was certain that Churchill’s decision 
to attack Dieppe was sheer madness 
and idiocy but it was the payment 
required from Stalin. He was equally 
certain that the calamity on the 
beaches at Dieppe had dealt a double 
blow to Churchill and the British, 
damaging the former’s standing as 
a war leader and the latter’s claim to 
be a capable and equal partner in the 
alliance with the US and the USSR.16
The successful German defence 
at Dieppe dominated the Friday 
edition of the Völkischer Beobachter 
and the front pages of all the other 
newspapers in Nazi Germany.17 It 
was also the first time that Germans 
were able to read about the raid 
in their local and national papers. 
The headline in the VB was Die 
vernichtende Abfuhr von Dieppe! (The 
Scathing Rebuff at Dieppe!) and the 
leading articles addressed the main 
themes that Hitler and Goebbels had 
decided on in Vinnitsa: Churchill’s 
invasion catastrophe,  Stal in’s 
displeasure with his western allies, 
and the folly of the Second Front. The 
VB continued with much the same 
coverage over the weekend, deriding 
British military incompetence and 
praising the “excellent strategy of the 
Führer to block a two front war by 
winning the war with Russia while 
maintaining strong defences in the 
west.”18 Dieppe was proof, if any 
was needed, that the cost of opening 
a Second Front was prohibitive and 
in 1942 well beyond the military 
In the immediate aftermath of the failed raid German soldiers comb through the debris of the battle searching for intelligence.
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8capabilities of the Americans and 
the British. Goebbels was pleased 
with the newspaper reporting on 
the Dieppe raid and even more so by 
the public reaction. He noted in his 
diary that the “German people were 
filled with enthusiasm by the success 
achieved in halting the English attack 
at Dieppe,” and that “they feel secure 
that the defences in the west are 
strong.”19
The weekend ended with the first 
screening of a newsreel that showed 
the results of the Dieppe raid. Images 
of shattered tanks and landing craft 
shrouded in the smoke of battle 
filled the screen. The beaches were 
littered with the debris of beaten 
and demoralised soldiers: hundreds 
of discarded helmets, rifles and 
other weapons, and a few remaining 
bodies of the dead that had not yet 
been removed for burial. Goebbels 
further noted in his diary that the 
newsreel footage was “proof of the 
English plan of attack on Dieppe 
and the large plans of the British and 
Americans.”20 Of equal importance, 
it was visual proof of the totality of 
the German victory. The propaganda 
value of the raid had been enormous 
but Goebbels was not content to let 
the story end with nothing more 
than triumphant boasting of a battle 
fought and won. He had read British 
and American newspaper reports of 
the raid and noticed that, in addition 
to prematurely and falsely declaring 
the invasion an overwhelming 
success, they ignored the significant 
contribution made by the Canadians. 
It was time, he thought, to shift the 
focus away from the military conduct 
to the political consequences of the 
raid.21 
Soon after the battle Goebbel’s 
propaganda ministry released a packet 
of photographs which were widely 
distributed to media outlets. Top – “On 
the beach at Dieppe!”; Middle – “After 
the battle!”; Bottom – “They landed in 
German captivity! They fought in vain.”
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9Dieppe and the German 
view of the strategic 
direction of the war in 
August 1942
The Monday edit ion of  the Völkischer Beobachter began with 
an attack on Churchill’s subservience 
to Stalin and the recklessness of 
his military strategy to appease his 
Soviet allies. Goebbels himself wrote 
a lengthy article that continued over 
two pages of the paper numerating 
the political rather than the military 
reasons behind Churchill’s decision 
to attack Dieppe and “the idiocy 
of Churchill bowing and scraping 
before the Bolsheviks.” Other articles 
amplified the dangerous game being 
played by the “Bolsheviks and the 
plutocrats” and the unseemly neglect 
of the Canadians who did the fighting 
and the dying but were ignored in the 
British and American reporting of the 
invasion. These themes continued 
to find column space in the VB for 
the rest of August but stories on the 
fighting on the Eastern Front grew in 
size and importance. On 23 August 
the advanced echelons of the Sixth 
Army reached the Volga just north 
of Stalingrad. Successful advances 
by German forces in the Caucasus 
and in Egypt were also reported and 
often included a photo collage on 
page three showing cheerful troops 
on the march to their next objective 
well supported by armour, artillery, 
and air power. The message was 
clear – the war in the East was being 
won and the defences in the West 
were formidable enough to prevent 
the British and the Americans from 
opening a Second Front.22
The mood in FHQ Wehrwolf 
was excellent throughout the rest of 
August. Hitler entertained a number 
of guests from Berlin including 
leading members of the party and 
senior military officers. On the 
evening of 26 August, Grand Admiral 
Raeder was his special dinner guest. 
Raeder was at the FHQ for one of 
the few Führer’s Naval Conferences 
that were held in the spring and 
summer of 1942. Hitler and Raeder 
discussed “the urgent necessity to 
defeat Russia” and how this would 
give Germany strategic depth to fight, 
if necessary, a lengthy naval war 
against the Anglo-Saxon sea powers 
until England and America could be 
brought to the point of discussing 
peace terms. The successful summer 
U-boat campaign in the North 
Atlantic, the navy’s crucial support 
for the war in Russia, and its future 
ship building objectives were also 
main items on the agenda.23 The day’s 
conference was productive and good 
natured and the evening dinner was 
relaxed and sociable. Hitler was in 
a talkative mood. He held forth on 
a range of subjects including Stalin 
and the industrialisation of Russia, 
remedies for high blood pressure, 
the Peace of Westphalia and modern 
Germany, fidgety bureaucrats, and 
the Dieppe raid. “The most important 
result of the Dieppe raid from our 
point of view,” he said, “is the 
immense fillip it has given to our 
sense of defensive security; it has 
shown us, above all, that the danger 
exists, but that we are in a position 
to counter it.”24 Hitler and his guests 
ended the evening by watching Die 
Deutsche Wochenschau (the German 
weekly newsreel). Earlier, Hitler 
telephoned Goebbels in Berlin to 
congratulate him on the “good 
success” this weekly news conveyed 
and he also noted how the images of 
Dieppe were so devastating for the 
prestige of the English. Goebbels told 
the Führer that the recent newsreels 
were in high demand in neutral 
countries because of their accuracy 
and objectivity, which was lacking 
in Allied press releases.25 Hitler was 
very satisfied.
The weekly newsreel of 26 
August 1942 was 19 minutes long. It 
began with an eight minute feature 
on the Dieppe raid, using a map 
taken from a captured officer to 
explain the British plan and execution 
of the raid, the successful defence 
by the German coastal garrison, 
and ended with large columns of 
Canadian prisoners being marched 
off the beach and through Dieppe into 
captivity. Throughout the film report 
the cameras provided a panorama 
view of the beach front revealing 
a large number of destroyed tanks 
and landing craft, and hundreds of 
Piles of helmets, ammunition and 
grenades collected after the raid 
are displayed by the Germans for 
propaganda purposes.
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10
discarded helmets, weapons, and 
other equipment. Regardless of 
whether it was a raid or an invasion 
the film images could not be denied; 
it was an unmitigated disaster for the 
British and their Canadian allies who 
provided the main body of troops 
for the attack. The next two features 
were very short scenes of the concrete 
fortifications and large coastal guns 
that were part of the Atlantic Wall and 
were followed by scenes of workmen 
from the German Labour Front and 
Hitler Youth busy building bigger 
and better defences on the Channel 
coast. The newsreel ended with the 
longest and most important story 
of the week, the summer offensive 
in southern Russia. This was the 
key to winning the war and the film 
showed happy and well fed German 
soldiers advancing deep into the 
Caucasus – the Schwerpunkt of the 
campaign – routing the remaining 
forces of the Red Army. There was 
very little narration throughout the 
newsreel. The viewer was left to 
make his or her own judgements on 
these extraordinary events based on 
the images viewed and the rousing 
score of martial and patriotic music 
that accompanied the film. It was 
truly Wagnerian in scale and scope, 
and the uplifting images of the film 
attested to the imminent prospect of 
a great German victory.26
Not surprisingly, Goebbels too 
was pleased with the newsreel, 
especially the music.27 The shift from 
the success at Dieppe to an impending 
victory in Russia was also picked up 
by the newspapers. Leading articles 
in the Völkischer Beobachter reported 
on the large number of Soviet aircraft 
and tanks that had been destroyed 
and the thousands of prisoners who 
were taken from an army that had lost 
its will to fight. The VB reported 261 
Soviet tanks destroyed in ten days of 
fighting and over 2,500 Soviet aircraft 
destroyed since the end of July. 
There were numerous photo spreads, 
presented as always on page three, 
visual proof of German success and 
sacrifice in Russia and North Africa. 
In an article recounting in detail the 
great tank battle and victory over the 
Red Army at Kalatsch at the end of 
July, it was noted that the Russians 
were using women as infantry. This 
surely was a sign that the end was 
near.28
Dieppe was a feature story for the 
last time in the Sunday, 30 August 
edition of the Völkischer Beobachter. 
The VB headline read: Das war 
Churchills Invasionskatastrophe! (This 
was Churchill’s invasion catastrophe!) 
Churchill’s failings and his personal 
responsibility for earlier military 
misadventures, such as the Gallipoli 
campaign in the First World War and 
the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940, were 
cited as portents of the catastrophe 
that befell the British and Canadians 
at Dieppe. In two substantive 
articles all the main themes of the 
VB’s previous coverage on Dieppe 
were revisited: Churchill’s military 
naivety and strategic subservience to 
Stalin, the poor planning and tactical 
incompetence evinced in the execution 
of the invasion attempt, and English 
willingness to let Canadians die in 
a fiasco. The British and American 
press brazenly and falsely claimed 
this raid was a successful invasion 
of France whilst contemptuously 
ignoring the significant Canadian 
contribution and sacrifice. Very little 
new information was provided in 
the Dieppe articles but there was 
accurate and substantial detail on 
the full plan of the operation, the 
order of battle, intercepted radio 
reports made by the landing forces 
throughout the day, and the enemy’s 
losses. Extensive excerpts from 
OKW’s official and final report on 
Dieppe were also published, citing 
the main reasons for the attack’s 
failure – insufficient fire support, 
failure to deploy airborne troops to 
“hold the ring,” an overly detailed 
plan and inflexible execution, and the 
amateurish way the British waged 
war. Other than the details provided, 
OKW’s final report was not dissimilar 
to the special bulletin issued on 19 
August, although it did caution that 
any future Anglo Saxon invasion, if 
one was attempted, would be “better 
and more robust and not necessarily 
at a port.”29
Dieppe was important to Hitler 
and the German people because 
it was proof that the “west wall” 
guaranteed the safety of Europe from 
an Anglo-American attack coming 
from the sea. The Wehrmacht was 
therefore free to concentrate its 
Canadian prisoners are escorted away 
from the beach, Dieppe, 19 August 
1942.
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maximum effort on defeating the 
Red Army and ending the war in 
the East. This was the theme that the 
Völkischer Beobachter as well as other 
German newspapers emphasised in 
a growing number of articles at the 
end of August and into September 
1942. On 30 August, the VB reported 
that two Soviet attacks at Rzhev and 
Kaluga had collapsed with the Red 
Army suffering heavy losses. The war 
was just days away from reaching 
its third anniversary and despite a 
few challenges and testing moments 
the Wehrmacht had achieved a 
series of outstanding successes as 
two contrasting maps of Europe in 
1939 and 1942 published in the VB 
clearly demonstrated. Again, the 
message to the VB’s German readers 
was clear – stay focused, continue to 
work diligently towards victory, and 
have faith in the Führer – this was 
the formula for protecting Germany 
from a two-front war and completing 
a historic victory.30 In addition to the 
newspapers, Goebbels also ensured 
that the weekly newsreels played their 
part in maintaining public morale 
and confidence in both the Führer 
and the German war effort. After re-
watching on 31 August the 26 August 
newsreel that covered the Dieppe 
raid and the offensive in southern 
Russia, the minister for propaganda 
expressed his unreserved joy that it 
conveyed the perfect sense of destiny 
of a German victory, just like in the 
film “Der Groβe König.”31 
Optimism about a bright future 
was also conveyed in less serious 
ways in the pages of the Völkischer 
Beobachter. On both 30 and 31 August 
there were a number of articles 
covering the third round of the 
football cup final. The favourites 
to win the cup were Schalke 04 but 
it was München 1860 that stole the 
headlines with a thumping 15:1 
victory over SS-Straβburg. August 
was also the season for the Richard 
Wagner festival in Bayreuth and 
the annual gala music festival in 
Salzburg, both of which received 
extensive coverage from the culture 
and music writers at the VB and in 
all the other national and regional 
newspapers.32
August ended, however, with 
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, 
newly promoted after his triumph 
at Tobruk in June, and the Afrika 
Korps resuming the offensive in 
Egypt. From the start of the battle 
everything went wrong. Rommel’s 
forces lacked ammunition and fuel, 
the RAF maintained control of the 
air throughout the battle, and lacking 
any element of surprise the combined 
German-Italian offensive quickly 
ground to a halt on 2 September. 
Rommel informed the OKW that 
he was breaking off the attack and 
withdrawing from Alam el Halfa. 
By 5 September the battle was over 
and the Axis forces were back at their 
starting positions.33
September winds of change
August had been a wretched month for the Allies but the 
fortunes of war turned against Hitler 
and the Wehrmacht in September. 
On the Eastern Front the combined 
German-Finnish attack to cut the 
Murmansk railway and prepare 
for the capture of Leningrad had 
failed and by early September the 
Russians had seized the initiative 
in the north. Army Group Centre 
was having a difficult summer, too, 
suffering serious disturbance from 
heavy partisan activity in its rear 
areas.34 The summer offensive in 
the south was also not proceeding 
according to plan. On 20 August 
two Soviet armies launched a major 
counterattack against the Italian 
Eighth Army near Serifimovich 
on the Don River, delaying the 
German Sixth Army’s assault on 
Stalingrad.35 In the Caucasus, Field 
Marshal Wilhelm List’s Army Group 
A fell considerably short of Hitler’s 
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expectations. Maikop was taken in 
mid-August but the retreating Soviet 
forces destroyed the oil refineries. 
Chronic shortages in ammunition 
and fuel, a common problem for 
all German armies in the summer 
and autumn of 1942, slowed Army 
Group A’s advance to a crawl and 
left the rich oil fields of Grozny and 
Baku agonizingly out of reach. On 1 
September, List was summoned to 
FHQ Wehrwolf to report in person on 
his lack of progress. List’s meeting 
with Hitler went reasonably well 
considering the circumstances. Hitler 
restated Army Group A’s objectives 
and expressed his willingness, “if 
necessary to postpone the offensive 
to next year if Baku was captured.” 
List flew back to his headquarters at 
Stalino with renewed purpose and 
vigour. A few days later advanced 
forces of Army Group A entered 
Novorossisk, a key Black Sea port, but 
they could not hold it against fanatical 
Soviet resistence. Hitler’s patience 
was at an end and on 7 September 
he despatched General Alfred Jodl, 
chief of operations at OKW, to List’s 
headquarters “to press once more 
for the advance to be speeded up.” 
Jodl returned to FHQ Wehrwolf the 
same night and made his report. He 
told Hitler that List was adhering 
strictly to his instructions and that he 
(Jodl) agreed with the field marshal’s 
course of action. Hitler was furious 
and accused Jodl of siding with List 
and the army against him. Tensions 
between Hitler and his generals had 
escalated throughout August but they 
reached boiling point in September. 
General Walter Warlimont, deputy 
chief of operations at OKW, recorded 
in his memoir that Hitler’s rage 
with Jodl “produced a crisis which 
shook Supreme Headquarters to its 
foundations, the like of which was 
not to be seen [again] until the last 
months of the war.”36
At issue was the conflicting 
opinions between Hitler and his 
army generals over the course and 
direction of the war. Hitler was 
concerned with the wider strategic 
aspects of the war whilst the army 
high command increasingly focused 
on the tactical problems on the 
Eastern Front. Disagreements on the 
deployment of reserve forces and 
overstretched military resources had 
soured relations between Hitler and 
General Halder, chief of staff of the 
Army, in August. The unexpected 
and furious argument with Jodl, 
perhaps his most loyal and trusted 
general, changed Hitler’s relationship 
with the army for good. He no longer 
trusted the generals to carry out 
his orders and his interaction with 
them became more distant, painfully 
formal, and as brief as possible. From 
September to the end of the war 
Hilter’s military briefing conferences 
were recorded to prevent any further 
misinterpretation of his orders. Hitler 
also never appeared in the mess or 
ate with his generals again. Hitler’s 
displeasure with his generals did not 
end with his mere cessation of social 
interaction. On 9 September, List 
was dismissed and Hitler took over 
command of Army Group A himself. 
Rumours of other senior command 
changes spread like fire through 
the FHQ. Purportedly, Keitel was to 
be relieved by Kesselring and Jodl 
by Paulus, commander of the Sixth 
Army. Halder too was told by Keitel 
on 9 September that he also would 
shortly be replaced. In the end only 
Halder was relieved of his command. 
On 24 September Hitler dismissed 
him without further promotion or 
any other form of recognition. The 
next day General Kurt Zeitler was 
appointed chief of staff of the Army.37
After 7 September, Hitler accepted 
the fact that the Eastern army needed 
a rest and it would spend a second 
winter in the east before resuming 
the decisive attack the following 
spring.38 What exasperated Hitler was 
a growing certainty that his generals 
were not telling him the truth and 
that they were failing to conduct the 
campaign as he had ordered.39 Not 
surprisingly neither the newspapers 
nor the weekly newsreels covered 
the high command crisis in early 
September opting instead to publish 
glowing accounts of victories in 
the west and on the Eastern Front. 
Goebbels was pleased with their 
efforts in raising German morale 
but he was equally uneasy with the 
unrealistic expectations they created 
of an impending victory. It was 
important, he noted in his diary on 
11 September, that “we must keep 
everything into perspective so as not 
to fall into a trap.”40 Worrying signs 
of disillusionment with the war and 
with Hitler’s leadership were already 
apparent, the most serious being the 
Weiβe Rose student resistance group 
in Munich. Munich was the capital of 
the Nazi movement, and the spiritual 
centre of Hitler’s power. Nonetheless, 
between June and October 1942, the 
Weiβe Rose published and distributed 
four highly critical leaflets in Munich 
and other German cities, calling on 
fellow Germans to resist the Nazis 
and work towards helping the Reich’s 
enemies win the war. Their activities 
were serious enough to warrant 
the attention of the Reichsführer SS 
Heinrich Himmler.41
Hilter flew to Berlin on 27 
September for a busy week of political 
and public engagements.42 On 28 
September he spoke to 12,000 officer 
candidates and newly commissioned 
officers in the army, navy, Luftwaffe, 
and Waffen SS. The German News 
Bureau broadcast a brief summary of 
his speech at the Berliner Sportpalast:
In rousing words, the Führer afforded 
the young men an insight into the 
great history of Germany, which is 
being crowned in the mighty fateful 
struggle of our days. After referring 
to the high duties that are imparted to 
an officer as the head of the soldiers 
entrusted to him in the struggle, the 
Führer concluded his address by 
expressing his absolute certainty of 
victory and his unshakable trust in 
the superior fighting qualities of the 
German soldiers.43
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Hitler was still ruminating over 
his show down with Halder and 
the generals in his headquarters at 
Vinnitsa in the Ukraine. He was 
certain that the army’s tactical and 
technical skills were not enough 
to complete the difficult task of 
vanquishing the Russians. The army, 
and in particular the General Staff, 
he believed, “must be inspired by 
the fervour of belief in National 
Socialism.”44 The following day 
Hitler met in secret with his western 
commanders, telling them that the 
next invasion attempt in the West 
would rely far more on air power. He 
cautioned them not to be complacent: 
“We must realise that we are not alone 
in learning a lesson from Dieppe. The 
British have also learned. We must 
reckon with a totally different mode 
of attack and at quite a different 
place.” Their continued vigilance 
and the Atlantic Wall now had a vital 
role. He reassured them: “If nothing 
happens in the next year, we have 
won the war.”45
On 30 September, Hitler was back 
at the Berliner Sportpalast giving a 
major speech at the Volk rally opening 
the third Kriegswinterhilfswerk (Winter 
Relief Appeal).46 It was a long speech 
covering the entire course of the war 
from the beginning to the ongoing 
operations in the west and the east. 
Hitler combined a glorification of 
Germany’s military achievements 
with a mocking, sarcastic attack 
on  Churchi l l  and  Rooseve l t , 
emphasising the idiocy of the recent 
invasion attempt at Dieppe, and 
the unpredictability of the western 
allies, stating “you never know with 
these lunitics and constant drunks 
what they will do next.”47 Then 
he reassured his audience that the 
German army would take Stalingrad 
and that no matter when and where 
Churchill decided to invade next 
“he can consider himself fortunate if 
he stays on land for nine hours!” – a 
direct reference to the Wehrmacht’s 
recent success defending Dieppe.48 
Hitler bolstered the morale of his 
listeners by telling them that they 
could look back and be content with 
the last three years. He recounted the 
long list of substantial achievements 
and even the difficulties of the 
previous winter, which had been 
overcome with calm determination 
and led to reorganised and renewed 
efforts to complete a historic victory. 
He concluded his speech by restating 
current and future objectives. 
First, Stalingrad would be taken, 
completing the isolation of Moscow 
by cutting the Russian capital off 
from the Volga, the last arterial 
route of strategic importance, and 
thereby denying the Russians grain 
from the Ukraine and oil from the 
Caucasus. The armed forces would 
then hold what they had attained 
in the west and the Mediterranean 
until the following spring when 
the offensive in the east would be 
resumed. Russia, he asserted, was 
the key to either victory or defeat. 
A strong defence in the west was 
essential to safeguarding the main 
effort in the east and concomitantly 
a victorious campaign in Russia 
was the best way of preventing an 
invasion in the west.
Hitler returned to his FHQ in 
Vinnitsa on 4 October to oversee the 
capture of Stalingrad and the final 
phase of operations in the Caucasus 
before the winter break.49 Germany’s 
autumn operations, however, did not 
proceed according to Hitler’s grand 
predictions so confidently made at 
the end of September in the Berliner 
Sportpalast. Instead, matters became 
progressively worse. On 23 October 
the British resumed the offensive in 
North Africa at El Alamein. Then on 8 
November the British and Americans 
invaded French North Africa, landing 
in Morocco and Algeria in the first 
major combined Anglo-American 
operation of the war. Eleven days 
later the Soviets initiated Operation 
Uranus, a strategic counter offensive 
aimed at destroying German forces 
in and around Stalingrad. The tide, 
as Sir Arthur Bryant so eloquently 
concluded at the end of the first 
volume of his history of the Second 
World War, had turned.50 
Conclusion
There are many misconceptions about what the Germans knew 
about an invasion attempt in the west 
before the Dieppe raid and how they 
reacted to it afterwards. Most do not 
stand up to rigorous examination 
of the documentary evidence. Well 
before August 1942, Hitler and the 
German High Command were aware 
of the increasing threat of an invasion 
and they undertook specific measures 
to address it from December 1941. 
As this article has demonstrated, the 
Dieppe raid was a tactical, not an 
operational or a strategic, surprise. 
It did not cause either Hitler or 
the German High Command any 
undo panic. Russia was their main 
effort, both before and after the raid, 
throughout 1942. For clear political 
and strategic reasons the raid was 
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
PA
 1
30
02
3
Hitler cautioned his generals in 
September: “We must realise that we 
are not alone in learning a lesson from 
Dieppe. The British have also learned. 
We must reckon with a totally different 
mode of attack and at quite a different 
place.”
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portrayed in the German media 
as a failed attempt at opening the 
Second Front. Hitler encouraged this 
approach even though he knew that 
Dieppe was little more than a badly 
executed raid at a time when the Allies 
were going through a severe military 
and political crisis. The propaganda 
value of the raid was immense and 
it was embraced wholeheartedly. 
Goebbels used every facet of his 
state controlled media empire to 
heap ridicule on the Western Allies 
for their military incompetence 
and their abysmal failure to end 
the isolation of the Soviet Union 
as German forces continued their 
advance in southern Russia. The 
Dieppe Raid also proved useful to 
Hitler and the Nazis in their efforts to 
bolster public support for the war and 
strengthen morale on the home front. 
German newspapers, specifically the 
Völkischer Beobachter, and newsreels 
hailed the Führer’s strategic brilliance 
in avoiding a two-front war whilst 
the bulk of the German armed forces 
strained every sinu to complete 
their historic mission in Russia. Less 
obvious at first was how the raid 
and the Nazi interpretation of it 
exacerbated the differences between 
Hitler and some of his Eastern Front 
generals, most notably Halder, over 
the course and direction of the war. 
The ongoing pressures in concluding 
the campaign at Stalingrad and in 
the Caucasus led eventually to a 
complete breakdown between Hitler 
and his generals in September 1942. 
The generals demanded more men 
and more resources at a time when 
resources were limited and strategic 
pressure on a number of fronts – the 
Battle of the Atlantic, the air war, 
the Mediterranean, and the defence 
of the West – all demanded Hitler’s 
attention and more of the Nazi 
war machine’s severely stretched 
resources. Most importantly, the 
Dieppe raid did not alter German 
strategic thinking about the conduct 
of the war or defence against an 
invasion in the west. Russia was the 
key to both – victory and preventing 
a successful invasion. When D-Day 
finally came on 6 June 1944, Hitler 
and the Germans had already, by 
their own logic, lost the war.
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